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Abstract
The security issue in a distributed sensor network
has been drawing considerable research 
attention in recent years. management, a basic
service, becomes the core designfor various
security services, such as and
authentication. This paper proposes a scalable 
grouping random key predistribution scheme which
divides nodes into several groups and uses the one-
function to generate keys
to increase the connectivity of each key and to enlarge
the supportable network size.
1. Introduction
The development of wireless sensor networks has
become an important research topic in recent years due
to such critical application needs as emergency
response, medical monitoring, military tracking, energy 
management and pollution monitoring. As sensor
networks are deployed in unattended
environments, they can be easily assaulted or
compromised by adversaries. To enhance the security
of sensor networks, researchers have come up with a
number of important security services, including key 
management 1-21.
The following are basic features of a distributed 
wireless sensor network: 
Prone to failure
Limited by the processing power, battery life, 
communication bandwidth and memory space of sensor
nodes, the key management protocol should be simple
and light. Traditional key exchange mechanisms in
Low bandwidth and computing power 
Limited memory and energy resources 
Large scale of sensor nodes
Possibly without a central device
wired networks do not fit in DSNs due to high
computational overhead and considerable memory 
requirement. Key distribution protocols relying on
infrastructures or trusted third parties are also
impractical because of restricted communication ranges 
and inability to about the network topology 
before deployment. As each node may only
communicate with its neighbor nodes, the random key
predistribution scheme [3] is appropriate for large scale
There are two extreme cases of key predistribution:
( 1 ) each node stores a single master key and each
node stores all the other nodes’ pairwise keys. In case
each node consumes only a little memory space. 
But when the adversary compromises a node, the entire
network gets disrupted. Case (2) is able to provide the
highest security because the key that every two nodes 
use to communicate with each other is unique. This is
nevertheless unfeasible due to limited memory 
resources of the node. For instance, assuming is the
number of nodes in the network, it will be difficult for 
each node to store - 1 keys when is large.
Using the concept of random key predistribution, 
this paper presents a Scalable Grouping random
key predistribution scheme, briefed as the SG scheme.
The proposed scheme, a of the Unique
Assigned One-way (UAO) function scheme divides
all nodes into several groups and uses the one-way
function to generate group-to-group keys. To
assure that the link key used to secure a link is nearly
unique, the SG scheme uses the exclusive-OR
operation to compose the link key when two nodes
have two or more shared keys. Simulation results show 
that the SG scheme is able to support larger networks 
and yield better resilience against node capture. The
scalability of the SG scheme also proves higher than
that of other random key based schemes. 
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2. Previous random key based schemes 
2.1 The random key predistribution scheme 
This basic scheme includes three phases: key 
distribution, shared-key discovery and path-key
establishment. In the first phase, each node picks keys
from a large key pool of S and stores into its memory
before deployment (I is called the node’s key ring). In
the second phase, each node tries to discover whether 
its neighbors share a key with it. If so, the shared key 
becomes the link key for their transmission, and a 
graph is gradually formed. In the last phase, if two 
neighbor nodes do not have a shared key, they will try
to establish a path-key through other secure links.
The basic scheme uses the Random graph theory [5]
to analyze the suitable parameter. Consider a random 
graph n nodes Assume the probability 
that a link exists between any two nodes is When
= 0, the graph has no edges; when 1, the graph is
fully connected. In we find the monotone property 
that there exists a threshold value of and that the 
property will move from “likely false” to “likely true” 
on whether graph G is fully connected. The threshold
function is defined as follows, where is the
desired probability that graph G is fully connected: 
- In(-
PI =
The expected number of secure links for a node will be
= x (n- 1) =
Now assume the average number of neighbor nodes 
n‘
for each node is Since the expected degree d is
calculated, we obtain the required probability p for two 
neighbor nodes to establish a secure link successfully 
2.2 The q-composite keys scheme [6]
The q-composite keys scheme works similarly as the 
basic scheme. To enhance security against 
scale attacks, the scheme employs a parameter For
any two nodes, it requires at least q shared keys to 
establish a secure link, and the link key K is generated
as the hash of all shared keys, 
= where
As the probability for any two nodes to share at least
keys may be less than the required probability the
key pool size needs to shrink until the probability of
connectivity equals p .
2.3 The random-pairwise keys scheme 
The basic idea of the random-pairwise keys scheme 
i s to store sufficient pairwise keys in each node to form
a connected graph, instead of all the other 
nodes’ painvise keys. Assume each node stores at 
P
m keys and the required probability for two neighbor 
nodes to setup a secure link is The maximum 
supportable network size n can be calculated as 
The random-pairwise keys scheme IS able to provide
node-to-node authentication properties as uses
keys instead of picking keys from a large key 
pool. The fact that each key used to secure links is
unique also helps the scheme produce more desirable 
resilience against node capture
schemes.
2.4 The Unique Assigned 
function scheme [4]
than the above two
One-way (UAO) 
The UAO scheme also uses keys, derived 
from a unique one-way function in each node, to 
establish the secure link. It can support larger networks 
than the random-pairwise keys scheme due to less 
required node memory. Before nodes are deployed, the 
key decision algorithm is performed. Suppose each 
sensor node has a unique identifier ID, and is
assigned a unique one-way function Each node first 
randomly selects I node identifiers (I is the required 
number of keys) to achieve the connected graph, 
calculates r pairwise keys by the following equation 
= being the selected node identifier), and 
then memorizes pairs of and
After the deployment, each node the
to-node authentication protocol to set up the secure link 
with its neighbors. Each node first broadcasts its 
identifier to the neighbor nodes. Nodes that receive 
the identity will verify whether is
combined with any key in their key rings. If node j
finds a key combined with it will send a request 
message encrypted by and its identifier to node i.
When node i receives the request message, it obtains 
the key by computing Thus both nodes i and
can verify the link key through a 
response process, and establish a secure link between 
them.
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3. The proposed Scalable Grouping (SG)
random key predistribution scheme
The proposed SG scheme aims to support more 
nodes in the sensor network and to provide desirable 
resilience against node capture. As mentioned, the
keys scheme [6] achieves the highest 
security at the cost of large node memory space. To
reduce such memory requirement, the UAO scheme 
uses the one-way function to assist the forming of link
keys and attains as favorable as the
keys scheme (because each key used to secure
a link is unique).
Different from the UAO scheme, the proposed SG
scheme divides all nodes into several groups to
increase the connecting ability of each key and to
enlarge the maximum supportable network size. It also
takes the concept that the link key is composed of some
shared keys to improve resilience against node capture.
The features of the scheme are listed below. 
Each node in the network has a group identifier. 
(2) Each group has at most k nodes.
(3) Nodes of the same group have a shared group key.
(4) Two nodes of different groups use the 
group key to establish the secure link. 
( 5 ) If two nodes have two or more shared keys. the
link key is the composite of these shared keys 
using the exclusive-OR operation. 
The k-SG scheme consists of three phases: 
3.1 Initialization
The initialization phase runs off-line. First we divide
all nodes into several groups, each group having at
most nodes. All the nodes of the same group have a
group identifier a group key and a one-way
function Each sensor node randomly selects r group
identifiers (r being the required number of keys to
achieve the connected graph), calculates r group
painvise keys being the selected group identifier 
and stores r pairs of and The equation
for generating group-to-group painvise keys is
3.2 Link key setup
After deployment, sensor nodes perform the link key 
setup. Each sensor node broadcasts its to the 
neighbor nodes and verifies the received If in the
same group, the neighbor node returns the message of
the same group and the list of its key ring; otherwise, 
returns group identifier Both nodes then
execute the link key setup algorithm. Assuming the 
group identifiers of nodes A and B are respectively 
GID,and the algonthm be defined as follows: 
i f ( = { node A belongs the same group with
if (node A has other shared keys with node
else
Link Key = shared keys 
else node A and node are not in the same group
switch
(node A has and node B has :
node A calculates
node B calculates =
break
node B calculates ,then
break
node A calculates ,then
break
case4 (node A doesn’t have and node B doesn’t
have :
node A cannot setup a secure link with node B ;
break
case2 (node A has but node doesn’t have :
case3 (node B has but node A doesn’t have :
Figure An example of link key setup.
Now suppose nodes A, B and C are neighbors in the
network, and their group identifiers are and
respectively. The key rings that the three nodes 
store are shown in Figure 1. As we can see, the link key
generated by nodes A and is composed of the
group key and one shard key the link key 
generated by nodes A and C i s the group-to-group
painvise key generated by node C using 
3.3 Secure link establishment
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After execution of the link key setup algorithm, if
two nodes have a link key they will verify the link 
key through a challenge-response protocol. If it turns 
out correct, a secure link will be established between 
the two nodes for communication. 
Basic scheme
The key ring size for each scheme i s listed in 
Table The size of the k-SG scheme includes a group 
key, k being the group size. 
200







Simulation runs have been out to evaluate the 
performance of the SG scheme and other schemes. 
Performance evaluation is analyzed based on the
security strength, the maximum supportable network 
size under limited memory resources, and the 
conformity to the limited global payoff requirement. 
The involved notations are defined as follows.
n :Number of sensor nodes in the network
n :Average number of neighbor nodes for each node 
:Key ring size number of keys in each node) 
:Probability for two neighbors to setup a secure link 
: Group size of the k-SG scheme
:Number of groups in the network, equal to n k
: Number of directly compromised links the
network at least one of the two nodes on this
link has been compromised)
Y : Number of additionally compromised links in the
network neither of the two nodes on this Iink is
compromised, but the link key can be recovered by 
the adversary) 
number of nodes for each group) 
4.1 The security strength 
The security of the SG scheme evaluated in terms
of resilience against node capture. The fraction of links 
in the network that an adversary is able to eavesdrop on
indirectly by recovering keys from the captured nodes 
is estimated as
Y
number of links -
The following are steps for calculating this fraction: 
Randomly pick nodes i is the expected number 
of compromised nodes. 
(2) Take all group keys and group-to-group
keys stored in i nodes into a database.
( 3 ) Take all one-way functions stored in the i nodes
into the database, so all the keys derived 
these functions are compromised.
(4) For each link that is not directly compromised, 
analyze the link key to see if it will be recovered
from the database. 
Figures 2 and 3 show the resilience against node 
capture under different numbers of sensor nodes for 
various schemes. Note that the keys
scheme [6]and the UAO scheme are represented as 
the line because the adversary cannot get the
global information local node capture. 
... . .. . 
0 3
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Figure 2. Number of compromised nodes versus
fraction of additional compromised links for
various schemes ( n= 1000, 60, = 0.33).
25 75 100 125 153 175 200
Number
Figure 3. Number of compromised nodes versus
fraction of additional compromised links for
various schemes = 2000, n’= 60, = 0.33).
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Figure 2 shows that the 2-SG scheme has the largest 
secunty strength. This is because the SG scheme uses 
the group key and the key, not 
picking keys from a large key pool. That is, whenever 
an adversary compromises a node, it can approximately 
get the about other nodes in the same
group only. As a result, the fraction of additional
compromised links can be significantly decreased, 
Figure 3 shows that when the network size extends 
(to =2000 in this case), the SG scheme provides even 
stronger This is because the ratio of
information obtained by the adversary to the whole 
network gets smaller in networks.
4.2 The maximum supportable network size
As the SG scheme uses keys to establish
secure links, the key ring size directly determines the 
probability for two neighbor nodes to set up a secure 
link. Scalability is hence restricted. Take the
keys scheme as an example. Assuming that the 
network size n = and the probability of
connectivityp = 0.33, the required key ring size r will
be r = x p = 3300, which is quite impractical in 
sensor networks. 
be the probability for two neighbor nodes with
the same group identifier to setup a secure link 
be the for two neighbor nodes with the 
different group identifiers to setup a secure link. p in
the SG scheme can be replaced by the following 
eauation
1 g is the probability for any two nodes to have the 
same group identifier, is one because the two nodes 
have a shared group key, and is one minus the 
probability that neither node has the key derived from 
the other's one-way function. Since the key ring size is 
the probability for any node to get a key derived 
from a particular node's one-way function is
From the above, the probability of connectivity in
the SG scheme can be derived as
or be simplified by g = k and becomes
Equation (2) is then used to evaluate the maximum 






Figure 4. Maximum supportable network sizes
for various schemes = 0.33, the key length =
128 bits and the size of the one-way function =
160
Figure 4 exhibits maximum supportable network 
sizes for various schemes. Among all schemes, the SG
scheme is shown to support the largest-sized network 
than other schemes, and when k increases, the 
maximum supportable network size also grows.
However, it will be more practical to keep k < 4
because of the limited global payoff requirement. 
4.3 The limited global payoff requirement
The limited global payoff requirement [6] is applied 
to the proposed SG scheme because its secure links
may be compromised indirectly, like the basic scheme 
or the q-composite scheme. The main purpose of such a
requirement is to prevent the adversary gaining
too much at too little expense. Take the basic scheme 
as an example. In a network with size = when
an adversary compromises 50 nodes, there will be
about 9.5% additionally compromised links. As the
ratio of compromised nodes to the whole network size 
is only the random key based schemes need to 
meet the following requirement to avoid such a 
situation:
The number of additional compromised links in the 
network the number of directly compromised links 
in the network Y
The limited global payoff ratio is thus defined to 
be Y X. When 1, indicates the limited global 
requirement has been satisfied.
Figure 5 shows the limited global payoff requirement 
for the 2-SG scheme. X and Y are evaluated in
and for different network sizes; ratio is
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Figure 5. Evaluation of the limited global payoff
requirement in 2-SG, where (a) n = 2210, (b) n =
3312, and n = 4414. The ratio is calculated
in
5. Conclusion
This paper presents a Scalable Grouping (SG)
random key scheme for large scale 
The SG scheme divides all nodes into several
groups and uses the one-way function to generate 
group-to-group keys to increase the 
connectivity of each key and to enlarge the maximum
supportable network size. To improve resilience 
against node capture, it takes the concept that the link 
key is composed of some shared keys. When two nodes
have two or more shared keys, the scheme uses the 
exclusive-OR operation to compose the link key --
assuring that the link key used to secure a link is nearly
unique. Expenmental results show that, due to its 
simple and effective designs. the SG scheme i s able to
yield more enhanced resilience against node capture in
large-scale networks, generate higher scalability than
existing random key based schemes, and limit global 
payoff from local compromised nodes. 
Figure 6. Evaluation of the limited global payoff
requirement in 3-SG,where (a) = 3315, (b) =
4968, and (c) = 6621. The ratio is calculated
in
calculated in We can see that regardless of the
key ring size and the number of nodes,
the 2-SG scheme constantly meets the global
payoff requirement (because the 3-SG
scheme, whose value ranges around 1 and up as 
Figure 6 depicts, barely meets the requirement 
(although it supports the largest network size among all
schemes). Note that we do not discuss the k-SG scheme 
with k 3 because in such cases the value is always
bigger than one - which apparently disagrees with the
limited global payoff requirement. 
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